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INTRODUCTION 
On October 23, 2008, economist and former Federal Reserve Chief Alan 
Greenspan lamented, “[t]hose of us who have looked to the self-interest of lending 
institutions to protect shareholders’ equity, myself included, are in a state of shocked 
disbelief,” noting further that, “[t]his modern risk-management paradigm held sway 
for decades,” and “[t]he whole intellectual edifice, however, collapsed in the summer 
of last year.”1  Greenspan’s lament was not well received,2 least of all by those of us 
who behaved in our borrowing practices but found ourselves underwater on our 
mortgages, found our retirement account values dwindling, and even found our 
money market funds frozen.  Indeed, the well had been poisoned by the errant 
behavior of others. 
Greenspan’s worldview was premised on centuries of research and empirical 
data on the benefits of an economic and political system that emphasized freedom of 
contracting and privatization of ownership.3  To doubt this collective human wisdom 
                                                 
∗ J.D. 2008, McGeorge School of Law; M.A. 1997, B.S. 1977, University of Delaware.  Mr. Boyle is 
the founder and Managing Director of Heuristic Strategies, LLC.  He may be reached at 
danielboyle@heuristicstrategies.com. 
1 Edmond L. Andrews, Greenspan Concedes Error on Regulations, THE NEW YORK TIMES, Oct. 24, 2008, 
at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/24/business/economy/24panel.html?_r= 
1&hp&oref=slogin.  
2 Id. (“Critics, including many economists, now blame former Fed chairman for the financial crisis that 
is tipping the economy into a potentially deep recession . . . that he failed to rein in the explosive 
growth of risky and often fraudulent mortgage lending.  ‘You had the authority to prevent 
irresponsible  lending practices that led to the subprime mortgage crisis’ [inquiry by Representative 
Henry A. Waxman] . . . ‘Do you feel that your ideology pushed you to make decisions that you wished 
you had not made?’  Mr. Greenspan conceded:  ‘Yes, I’ve found a flaw”.) 
3 See Avinash Dixit, Governance Institutions and Economic Activity, 99 AM. ECON. REV. 5, (MARCH 2009) 
(explaining that market economies are premised on governance for the security of property rights, the 
enforcement of contracts, and for collective action); see also JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, 
ECONOMICS IN PERSPECTIVE:  A CRITICAL HISTORY (Houghton Mifflin 1987) (tracing these concepts 
through history). 
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would be to deny the benefit of global growth from market economics.  Yet in 
retrospect and viewed from a different perspective, the combination of imbalances in 
borrowing and investment in the American economy, high levels of public and 
private leverage, the housing boom, and the extensive cross-collateralization and 
speculative trading through structured financial derivatives appeared bound to 
collapse the edifice.   
This article attempts to unravel this paradox and to better diagnose and 
correct the mistakes that led to the current crisis by looking deeper into the 
incentives, policies, and ideologies upon which Greenspan’s world view rested.  This 
exploration does not attempt to provide short term suggestions to mend the 
economy or even purport to know the precise formulation of regulatory regime 
corrections.  This article uses the economic and legal theories, governmental policies, 
and rules of the game to illustrate how those inform and guide banking and securities 
regulations, which in turn inform and guide the behavior of market participants. 
The different policy objectives and regulatory mechanisms of banking 
regulations—to preserve the safety and soundness of the system through 
oversight—and those of securities regulations—to preserve confidence in public 
securities through a regime of disclosure—operate with different dynamic responses 
and can be at odds during times of crisis and panic.  The reality of complex 
regulations and financial products, real time trading, the involvement of speculators, 
and the externalization of risk through derivatives all challenge the underlying 
assumptions of competitive markets.  In response, optimal regulatory regimes need 
to have the flexibility to respond dynamically, and this can include prophylactic 
components until longer term solutions are devised.   
Greenspan’s choice of words reminds us that the architects of modern 
economic theory have built an edifice of rules, regulations, and policy 
recommendations upon assumptions and premises about the behavior of markets, 
individual participants, and groups.  The result is a set of policies and regulations that 
form the “rules of the game” and establish the incentives for people and groups to 
behave, react, and respond.4 
For all the theoretical and architectural genius behind this edifice, we are now 
experiencing the disastrous and unintended consequences wrought when the 
assumptions underlying the edifice cannot sustain dynamic external pressures.  How 
did the regulatory mechanisms in banking, securities, and financial services provide 
                                                 
4 See infra Parts I, II.B-D, III.A (discussing several landmark concepts in the evolution of these ideas). 
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incentives for persons and institutions across the economy to poison the well?  Is the 
ideology of privatization and deregulation to blame for building up the imbalances 
that led to the current meltdown, or is it simply a matter of a few incremental tweaks 
that are needed to realign incentives?  The question is not a trivial one because we 
must take immediate measures to avoid further economic collapse while finding the 
correct structural adjustments to build a solid edifice for the future.  Making the 
structural and regulatory adjustments is among the main challenges of our times, 
requiring a clear understanding of how the current structures behave dynamically. 
With that goal in mind, this article retraces several key premises in economic 
theory and the process of formation, implementation, and adjudication of the 
statutes and regulations that form the legal framework to implement those theories.5  
The article begins by framing the problem in both an historical context and by 
indicating the regulatory challenges.  Next, the article reviews the economic theories 
that influenced the regulatory regimes and rules of the game that encouraged and 
permitted the situation to arise.  This includes a description of the dynamic nature of 
policy formation and social choice in the context of our democratic institutions for 
formation, implementation and adjudication of “the law.”  By contrasting the Glass-
Steagall Act of 1933 with the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999,6 the article illustrates 
the implications of these theories and dynamic realities.  This contrast exposes the 
challenge in solving for safety and soundness with tools designed for disclosure that 
are premised on allowing risk takers to make informed decisions that might lead to 
failure or loss.  The article concludes with some structural implications for revising 
the regulatory regimes affecting our banking and financial system. 
I.  FRAMING THE PROBLEM 
The historical context for the ongoing banking and financial crisis lends 
insight into the theoretical discussion and comparison of regulatory regimes.  As of 
mid November 2008 and “[s]ince late 2006, 303 major U.S. lending operations have 
‘imploded.’”7  In perspective, in the ninety-three-year period from 1867 to 1960, 
there were six periods of severe economic downturn that led to widespread distress 
                                                 
5 This article does not attempt to provide a survey of the vast literature on the subject, nor does it 
purport to reflect a comprehensive view of the field.  The aim is to illustrate the dynamic 
interdependencies connecting the influence that seminal economic theories have on our institutions of 
law and social choice and how these might explain the behavior of individuals and institutions in the 
context of the current crisis. 
6 See infra notes 19, 93-95 and accompanying text (discussing these acts).  
7 The Mortgage Lender Implode-O-Meter, Tracking the Housing Finance Breakdown:  A Saga of Corruption, 
Hypocrisy, and Government Complicity, http://ml-implode.com (last visited Nov. 13, 2008).  
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and unemployment; four of these included major banking crises.8  In particular, from 
1929 to 1933, one third of the nation’s banks disappeared, failed, or merged, 
resulting in a one-week cessation of all banking activities.9  In response, regulators in 
1933 suspended payments in an attempt to stabilize the downward spiral, but the 
system response was less than favorable.10  As described by Friedman and Schwartz: 
  Deposits of every kind in banks became unavailable to 
depositors.  Suspension occurred after, rather than before, liquidity 
pressures had produced a wave of bank failures without precedent.  
And far from preventing further bank failures, it brought additional 
bank failures in its train.  More than 5,000 banks still in operation 
when the holiday was declared did not reopen their doors when it 
ended, and of these, over 2,000 never did thereafter. . . .  The “cure” 
came close to being worse than the disease. 
One would be hard put to it indeed to find a more dramatic 
example of how far the result of legislation can deviate from 
intention than this contrast between the earlier restrictions of 
payments and the banking holiday under the Federal Reserve System, 
set up largely to prevent their repetition.11 
 The disconnect between regulatory intention and the systemic dynamic 
response stand as a lesson to regulators.  Today’s crisis, while not entirely unique, has 
its own set of driving forces.  Attempting to avoid a repeat of the 1933 banking 
panic, Congress implemented numerous regulatory authorities, institutional 
measures, and mechanisms.12  Over time, changes in the underlying markets, 
financial products, and behavior of participants have diminished, leading the 
International Monetary Fund to conclude recently that “an adverse feedback loop 
between the banking system and the global economy appears to be unfolding, as 
weakening economic conditions reinforce the credit deterioration and stress in 
mortgage, credit, and funding markets, with risks also rising in certain emerging 
                                                 
8 MILTON FRIEDMAN & ANNA JACOBSON SCHWARTZ, A MONETARY HISTORY OF THE UNITED 
STATES, 1857-1960 677 (Princeton Univ. Press 1971) (1963). 
9 Id. at 678. 
10 See id. at 330. 
11 Id. 
12  Among those authorities and measures, the Glass Steagall Act disallowed common ownership 
between investment and commercial banks.  See infra notes 93-94 and accompanying text. 
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markets that had shown considerable resilience until recently.”13  One key change has 
been the relative importance of nonbank financial institutions to the function of the 
global economy. 
 Several conditions and factors converged to precipitate the current financial 
crisis in the United States, but mortgage lending practices are like the straw that 
broke the camel’s back.  This straw was loaded on several macroeconomic 
imbalances of concern for decades:  negative savings, both public and private, and 
decades of trade deficits.  These imbalances persisted within a world of increasing 
integration of financial services and banking, a growing role for nonbank financial 
institutions, a period of low bank failures, and a proliferation of structured credit 
instruments.14  With foresight in 2006, the President and CEO of the New York 
Federal Reserve said: 
  [T]he greater relative importance of nonbank financial 
institutions also means that distress among these institutions has the 
potential to have a substantial impact on market behavior and 
liquidity.  Understanding these relationships is an important part of 
the risk management challenge for banks, even in a world where 
derivatives have helped spread risk more broadly.   
The innovations that have taken place in the credit derivatives 
market were driven to a significant degree by the losses experienced 
in past crises, but most of the growth in this market has occurred in 
relatively favorable overall economic and financial conditions 
. . . . 
Against the backdrop of an apparently healthy financial 
system, market participants report a substantial rise in transactions 
leverage, erosion in the use of loan covenants, more favorable 
financing terms for hedge fund counterparties, and especially a 
                                                 
13INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT:  FINANCIAL STRESS 
AND DELEVERAGING, MACROFINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS AND POLICY (Oct. 2008) available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/gfsr/2008/02/pdf/text.pdf (assessing the key issues, fault lines and 
systemic vulnerabilities in global financial markets). 
14 Timothy F. Geithner, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York and current Secretary of the Treasury, Remarks at the N.Y. Univ. Stern School of Bus.:  
Implications of Growth in Credit Derivatives for Financial Stability, (May 16, 2006) available at 
http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2006/gei060516.html. 
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pressure to reduce initial margin against OTC derivatives exposure to 
hedge funds.  But the concern is that this sustained period of very 
low credit losses and low volatility works to hold down measures of 
the underlying economic risk in these exposures.  This combined 
with the range of factors I just discussed, raises the odds that market 
participants will be faced with negative surprises in the event of a 
more adverse macroeconomic environment.  And this could have 
more negative implications for market dynamics and liquidity as 
market participants react to those losses and attempt to reduce their 
exposure to future losses. 
. . . . 
 . . .  [W]e believe that the major dealers, as well as the large 
commercial and investment banks, should take a cold, hard look at 
financing conditions and margin practice, particularly with respect to 
hedge fund counterparties and in OTC derivatives . . . to try to better 
understand the potential scale of losses the firm may face, and to 
carefully examine how well risk exposures reflect the overall risk 
appetite of the firm, and the size of the capital and liquidity cushion 
maintained in relation to those exposures. . . . 
. . . . 
. . .  We have been through a period of relatively favorable 
financial conditions, and the prospect for future stability will depend 
in part on the degree of care and conservatism market participants 
bring today to judgments about opportunity and risk management.15 
 Greenspan’s lament is that “market participants” did not heed Geithner’s 
exhortation.  What’s a regulator to do?  One might start by recognizing the 
magnitude of the problem and taking a quantitative look at risk exposure:   
Notional amounts of interest rate derivatives outstanding grew 22 
percent to $464.7 trillion in the first half of 2008.  For the year as a 
whole, interest rate derivatives notionals rose 34 percent.  The 
notional amount of outstanding of credit default swaps (CDS) 
                                                 
15 Id.  
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dropped 12 percent to $54.6 trillion in the first half of 2008.  CDS 
notional growth was 20 percent for the year as a whole.16   
The notional value of derivatives held by U.S. commercial banks 
increased $1.8 trillion in the second quarter, or 1 percent, to $182.1 
trillion. . . .  Changes in notional volumes are generally reasonable 
reflections of business activity, and therefore can provide insight into 
revenue and operational issues.  However, the notional amount of 
derivatives contracts does not provide a useful measure of either 
market or credit risks.17 
 Even though notional volumes are not themselves a measure of market or 
credit risk, in context, the data and remarks are ominous.  As for the data, in 
comparison to the notional value of $464.7 trillion, the total Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) for the entire world in 2007 was $54.3 trillion, and the market 
capitalization of all the world’s stock markets combined was $64.6 trillion.18  More 
recently, on September 23, 2008, the Chairman of the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission commented on the regulatory relationship to these figures:  
The failure of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act to give regulatory 
authority over the investment bank holding companies to any agency 
of government was, and based on the experience of the last several 
months, a costly mistake.  There is another similar regulatory hole 
that must be immediately addressed to avoid similar consequences.  
The $58 trillion notional market in credit default swaps [CDS]—
double the amount outstanding in 2006—is regulated by no one.  
Neither the SEC nor any regulator has authority over the CDS 
market, even to require minimal disclosure to the market.  This is an 
area that our Enforcement Division is focused on using our antifraud 
authority, even though swaps are not defined as securities, because of 
concerns that CDS offer outsized incentives to market participants to 
see an issuer referenced in a CDS default or experience another credit 
event. 
                                                 
16 International Swaps and Derivatives Association, Inc., Summary of Recent Survey Results, 
http://www.isda.org/statistics/recent.html (last visited on Nov. 2, 2008). 
17 COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC’S QUARTERLY REPORT ON BANK TRADING AND 
DERIVATIVES ACTIVITIES, SECOND QUARTER 2008 (2008) available at 
http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/release/2008-115a.pdf (last visited Feb. 03, 2009). 
18 World Bank Development Indicators Database, available at http://www.worldbank.org.  
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. . .  CDS buyers can ‘naked short’ the debt of companies 
without restriction.  This potential for unfettered naked shorting and 
the lack of regulation in this market are cause for great concern.19 
 For its part, The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”) allowed 
national banks to “enter into contingent credit default swaps (‘C-CDS’) and hold 
below-investment grade debt to hedge and mange the counterparty credit risks and 
liability exposures that arise from its derivative activities.”20  Under its “safety and 
soundness” review, the OCC noted that the “proposed risk management activities 
raise unique reputation risk issues.”21  The views of these three regulatory bodies—
the Federal Reserve, SEC, and OCC—frame the analysis which follows as an inquiry 
into the theoretical, economic, and practical regulatory foundations of the current 
crisis.  Following the discussion of those policies and decisions which led to these 
regulatory “lacuna,”22 this article will illustrate the theoretical principles behind the 
dynamic evolution from the Glass-Steagall Act to the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. 
II.  ECONOMIC FOUNDATION 
 Contrasting views of the role of government regulation between the Glass 
Steagall Act and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act illustrate the tension between 
traditions of free market economics and the need for regulatory restraint of market 
forces, both of which have been a theme of modern political economy.  The 
contours of the debate center on efficiency, ownership, social cost, and incentives.  
In other words, how to optimize public welfare through the institutions of society.  
Entrenched views on these maters have, in turn, become the contours of political 
ideology, the proper role of government, and the design of regulatory incentives.  
The behavior of market participants in balancing their gains with their risk exposure 
and potential losses is the paradigm of “self-interest” which appeared to go off the 
                                                 
19 Christopher Cox, Chairman of U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, Testimony Before the Comm. on 
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate, Concerning Turmoil in U.S. Credit Markets (Sept. 
23, 2008), available at http:www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2008/ts092308cc.htm. 
20O.C.C. Interpretive Letter #1051 (March 2006) available at http://www.occ.gov/interp/mar06/ 
int1051.pdf.  
21 Id. 
22 The press and others have referred to the regulatory gaps as “lacuna,” clearly a polite euphemism 
for loopholes.  In light of the opaque consequences of these loopholes, they seem more like financial 
black holes. 
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rails, causing Greenspan’s “state of shocked disbelief.”23  It is here that we need to 
retrace the “whole intellectual edifice.”24 
A.  Efficiency 
In theory, inefficiency wastes resources, benefiting no one.25  The foundation 
principle of exchange efficiency in market economies is known as “Pareto Efficient 
Allocation” because it is “[a]n allocation of resources in which no mutually beneficial 
trading opportunities are unexploited.26  That is, an allocation in which no person 
can be made better off without someone else being made worse off.”27  Under this 
principle, “individuals decide for themselves whether particular trades improve 
utility.”28  Thus, the first brick in the economic foundation of a market economy is 
freedom of contract, because it allows individuals to optimize their utility and, in the 
aggregate, optimizes society’s welfare.29 
The next row of bricks in the foundation expands on the premise that when 
persons exchange freely, using the competitive equilibrium price as the medium of 
                                                 
23 See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
24 See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
25 One economics textbook for undergraduates compares efficiency in economics to how the term is 
used in mechanical engineering by comparing outputs to inputs.  For example, the text analyzes the 
quantity of usable power obtained from a given quantity of fuel input.  CAMPBELL R. MCCONNELL, 
ECONOMICS 25 (6th ed. 1975); see also CARLTON & PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 
102-105 (2d ed. 1994) (“The competitive equilibrium of price and quantity has two desirable efficiency 
properties . . . production is efficient in the sense that all products are produced at the minimum 
possible cost . . . there is no possible rearrangement of resources (such as labor, machines and raw 
materials) among firms that can increase the output of one product without also reducing the output 
of at least one other product. . . .  The amount of each product produced and consumed is efficient. . . 
.  No rearrangement of goods among consumers can benefit one consumer without harming at least 
one other. . .  The cost to society of a market not operating efficiently is called deadweight loss.”).  
26 WALTER NICHOLSON, MICROECONOMIC THEORY:  BASIC PRINCIPLES AND EXTENSIONS 235 (6th 
ed. 1995). 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
29 See id. at 106, 546-547 (tracing Adam Smith’s “invisible hand” through Pareto, Edgeworth, and 
others to explain the efficiency optimizing role of free exchange between parties and the use of price 
to ensure optimal allocation of resources across society). 
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exchange, they will optimize their utility and participate in uncoerced bargaining.30  In 
the aggregate, this leads to the optimal allocation of resources for society without a 
formal market mechanism.31  Libertarians and proponents of laissez-faire theories of 
economics might stop here, but the mortar that holds this row together is a set of 
assumptions about when, if ever, we have “competitive equilibrium prices.” 
Key among the assumptions underpinning the notion of competitive 
equilibrium that need to be understood before developing policy recommendations 
and institutional incentive mechanisms include the following:  that actors are rational, 
that they have complete information, and that the market is not distorted by 
imperfect competition because agents assert market power.32  Another essential 
assumption in this paradigm is that the market interactions of participants do not 
include externalities whereby prices no longer capture benefits and costs because 
such externalities interfere with the ability of the price mechanism to optimally 
allocate resources.33  Even this partial set of caveats should cause us to pause and ask 
if the “competitive equilibrium price” exists at all in practice.  Another point worth 
mentioning is that the theoretical foundation for this efficient allocation mechanism 
has no premise in equity; the theory does not address anything concerning the initial 
allocations to the parties.34 
                                                 
30 Id. at 229-251 (describing exchange benefits from voluntary trade, deriving the Edgeworth Box 
diagram of Pareto efficiency, and using those to derive contract curves whereby market equilibrium 
prices show traders how to obtain efficient allocations of resources). 
31 Id. 
32 See CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 25 at 86-87 (“Perfect competition provides a benchmark 
against which the behavior of other markets is judged. . . .  We define perfect competition as a market 
outcome in which all firms produce homogeneous, perfectly divisible output and face no barriers to 
entry or exit; are price takers; and there are no externalities.”); see also NICHOLSON supra note 26, at 
563 (“Although the number of departures from perfect competition that we might discuss is 
practically infinite, they can be classed into three general groupings that include the most interesting 
cases: (1) imperfect competition, (2) externalities, (3) public goods. . . ‘Imperfect competition’ includes 
all those situations in which economic agents exert some market power in determining price.”). 
33 See id. at 546, 559-60, 565-68. 
34 See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 136-42 (The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press 
1977) (1971) (giving a discussion of equity and initial allocations and positing a thought experiment 
based on a contract that we might have wanted to strike with each other and with the institutions of 
society before we were born into our initial endowments.  Rawls calls this the “original position” 
behind the “veil of ignorance.”  He goes on to derive two fundamental fairness rules for organizing 
our “contract” that might be paraphrased as “to do unto others as you would have others do unto 
you,” and to organize institutions to create the opportunity to receive as much benefit as possible 
without taking away from everyone else). 
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Of course, the edifice still has many stories, but given this partial—yet 
substantive—list of imperfections, like Greenspan’s own introspective comment, 
one might begin to ask how the craze over deregulation and privatization ever gained 
so much capital.  Indeed, the explanatory retort to Mr. Greenspan could proceed 
along numerous lines, but because this article is dedicated to exploring the 
intersection of banking and securities regulations with respect to the recent financial 
crisis, the analysis emphasizes the role of externalities and information and how they 
affect participants.  This leads us to a string of Nobel Prize winning economists and 
to their thoughtful explorations of how these assumptions affect outcomes and the 
behavior of participants. 
B.  Externalities 
In economic terms, “[a]n externality occurs whenever the activities of one 
economic agent affect the activities of another agent in ways that are not reflected in 
market transactions.”35  Coase explained that when markets face externalities, 
governments are in a position to participate and thereby change the delimitation of 
rights, but they do so with transactional costs.36  Coase cautioned: 
The problem which we face in dealing with actions which have 
harmful effects is not simply one of restraining those responsible for 
them.  What has to be decided is whether the gain from preventing 
the harm is greater than the loss which would be suffered elsewhere 
as a result of stopping the action which produces the harm. . . .37 
. . . . 
. . .  [T]he problem is to devise practical arrangements which 
will correct defects in one part of the system without causing more 
serious harm in other parts.38 
. . . .  
A second feature of the usual treatment of the problems 
discussed in this article is that analysis proceeds in terms of a 
                                                 
35 See NICHOLSON, supra note 26, at 802. 
36 R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, J.L. & ECON., Oct. 1960, at 1, 18. 
37 Id. at 27. 
38 Id. at 34. 
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comparison between a state of laissez-faire and some kind of ideal 
world. . . .  A better approach would seem to be to start our analysis 
with a situation approximating that which actually exists, to examine 
the effects of a proposed policy change and to attempt to decide 
whether the new situation would be, in total, better or worse than the 
original one.  In this way, conclusions for policy would have some 
relevance to the actual situation.39 
. . . . 
It would be clearly desirable if the only actions performed 
were those in which what was gained was worth more than what was 
lost.  But in choosing between social arrangements within the context 
of which individual decisions are made, we have to bear in mind that 
a change in the existing system which will lead to an improvement in 
some decisions may well lead to a worsening of others.  Furthermore 
we have to take into account the costs involved in operating the 
various social arrangements (whether it be the working of a market or 
of a governmental department), as well as the costs involved in 
moving to a new system.  In devising and choosing between social 
arrangements we should have regard for the total effect.  This, above 
all, is the change in approach I am advocating.40  
Continuing with the discussion of externalities and resting on the firm 
foundation laid by Coase, Demsetz elaborated on the connection between laws 
granting property rights, which express the “consent of fellowmen to allow him to 
act in particular ways,” their specification of how persons may be harmed or 
benefited, and who must pay to modify the actions of others.41  After recognizing 
that society grants property rights through laws, customs, and regulations, Demsetz 
explained: 
 A primary function of property rights is that of guiding 
incentives to achieve a greater internalization of externalities.  Every 
cost and benefit associated with social interdependencies is a 
potential externality.  One condition is necessary to make costs and 
benefits externalities.  The cost of a transaction in the rights between 
                                                 
39 Id. at 43. 
40 Id. at 44. 
41 Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 347 (May 1967). 
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the parties (internalization) must exceed the gains from 
internalization.  In general, transacting cost can be large relative to 
gains because of “natural” difficulties in trading or they can be large 
because of legal reasons.  In a lawful society the prohibition of 
voluntary negotiations makes the cost of transacting infinite.  Some 
costs and benefits are not taken into account by users of resources 
whenever externalities exist, but allowing transactions increases the 
degree to which internalization takes place.42 
Demsetz helps us understand that laws and regulations change the 
boundaries of ownership rights, creating externalities.  This is a dynamic process: 
If the main allocative function of property rights is the 
internalization of beneficial and harmful effects, then the emergence 
of property rights can be understood best by their association with 
the emergence of new . . . and harmful effects.  
. . . .  
. . .  New techniques, new ways of doing . . . things—all 
invoke harmful and beneficial effects to which society has not been 
accustomed.  It is my thesis in this part of the paper that the 
emergence of new property rights takes place in response to the 
desires of the interacting persons for adjustment to new benefit-cost 
possibilities. 
The thesis can be restated in a slightly different fashion:  
property rights develop to internalize externalities when the gains of 
internalization become larger than the cost of internalization.  
Increased internalization, in the main, results from changes in 
economic values, changes which stem from the development of new 
technology and opening of new markets, changes to which old 
property rights are poorly attuned.  A proper interpretation of this 
assertion requires that account be taken of a community’s preferences 
for private ownership. . . . 
. . .  These adjustments have arisen in Western societies 
largely as a result of gradual changes in social mores and in common 
                                                 
42 Id. at 348. 
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law precedents.  At each step of this adjustment process, it is unlikely 
that externalities per se were consciously related to the issue being 
resolved.  These legal and moral experiments may be hit-and-miss 
procedures to some extent but in a society that weights the 
achievement of efficiency heavily, their viability in the long run will 
depend on how well they modify behavior to accommodate to the 
externalities associated with important changes in technology or 
market values.43 
The balance of Demsetz’s paper deals with the dichotomy between 
communal and private ownership and how internalization under private ownership 
avoids the externalities associated with problems such as the “tragedy of the 
commons,” and is used to preface the body of property law in a major textbook on 
the subject.44  Seen in the context of the Cold War and the contemporary debate 
between communism and capitalism, the fact that Demsetz’s disciples focused more 
on the ideological implications of his paper illustrates two of Demsetz’s points:  that 
legal rules need to be seen in their social context and that the adjustments comprise a 
dynamic set of “hit and miss procedures.”45 
As a bookmark at this point, let’s apply the principles described by Coase and 
Demsetz to the recent history of the collateralization of mortgage backed securities 
and the broad based explosion of derivatives like credit default swaps.  As financial 
services integrated and the deregulation of banking allowed the creation of 
commonly owned holding companies in the investment and banking fields, the 
regulations in response to these new techniques provided incentives to market 
participants like banks and hedge funds to internalize the benefits of these changes 
while externalizing the costs.  This raised a systemic risk to the rest of society.  Both 
the revolution in products and technology and the regulatory changes were 
externalities.  Because the transaction costs were lower than the gains, the market 
actors modified their ownership boundaries to capture the benefits by internalizing 
revenues from these new products while externalizing their risks and costs.46  
                                                 
43 Id. at 350. 
44 JESSEE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 35-50 (6th ed. 2006). 
45 See supra note 43 and accompanying text.  Demsetz’s paper was published in 1967, the height of the 
Cold War. 
46 This is what I mean when I say they “poisoned the well.”  Excluding acts of fraud, and without 
reference to intent or scienter to misrepresent, the intentional behavior of executives, directors, and 
officers of financial companies seeking to optimize return to their shareholders, to the extent 
permitted within the boundaries of fraud, was rational.  Practicing attorneys who seek to find liability 
on the part of officers and directors of these firms might consider borrowing a page from 
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Recognizing this in the context of the current financial crisis leads to significantly 
different policy prescriptions than those associated with problems of information 
asymmetry, the subject of the next section. 
C.  Information Symmetry 
Another deviation from competitive equilibrium results from asymmetric 
information.  In his seminal work on the relationship between quality and 
uncertainty, Akerloff notes that in markets where buyers use statistics to judge 
quality, “there is incentive for sellers to market poor quality” resulting in a difference 
between social and private returns and a case for either government intervention or 
the possibility that private institutions (i.e., insurance) will rise to capture the welfare 
benefits.47  Akerloff warned that a concentration of power in private institutions may 
lead to “ill consequences.”48  Exposing the interplay among dishonesty, trust, and 
gaming for advantage, Akerloff explained how the tension between adverse selection 
and moral hazard in insurance, reflecting the underlying quality uncertainty, leads to 
market imbalances and the rise of institutional mechanisms to establish trust and 
restore balance.49 
Beyond the laws and regulations protecting against outright dishonesty or 
fraud, insurance, public and private guarantees, brand value, ratings agencies, ratings, 
and disclosure rules are all institutional responses to this fundamental tension that 
creates a market to bridge the gap between an asset’s true underlying value and the 
uncertainty surrounding that value.  Indeed, the Efficient Capital Market 
Hypothesis50 is built on the principle that market prices for financial assets, which are 
regularly traded, reflect all available information.  This hypothesis motivates an array 
                                                                                                                                     
environmental law and tort theories of nuisance, but such an exploration is beyond the scope of this 
paper. 
47 George A. Akerloff, The Market for “Lemons”:  Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q. J. 
ECON. 488, 488 (Aug. 1970). 
48 Id. 
49 Id. at 492-500. 
50 See, e.g., DOUGLAS R. EMERY & JOHN D. FINNERTY, PRINCIPLES OF FINANCE WITH CORPORATE 
APPLICATIONS 26 (1st ed. 1991) (“Formally, the Principle of Capital Market Efficiency states that 
Market Prices of financial assets that are traded regularly in the capital markets reflect all available information and 
adjust fully and quickly to ‘new’ information.”). 
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of Securities and Exchange Commission rules and regulations on disclosure, and it is 
further embedded in the jurisprudence surrounding securities cases.51 
Without challenging the validity of the hypothesis, the question we need to 
address is the role of information in resolving the current crisis.  The effective use of 
securities laws and the governing of institutions and principles to correct the 
problems that have surfaced depend on a clear understanding of the role of 
disclosure, as opposed to other deficiencies such as the externalities described above 
and dynamic gaming described below.  Practically speaking, the fact that market 
traders react in milliseconds to perceived and real variations in asset values 
exacerbates the fundamental conflict in objectives between a regulatory regime 
optimized around transparency and information disclosure and one that optimizes 
around protecting the safety and soundness of banking institutions, especially when 
they come under stress. 
Jumping ahead to more recent literature, the voice of Joseph Stiglitz further 
illuminates the importance of information asymmetry in the design of our 
institutions: 
The recognition that information is imperfect, that obtaining 
information can be costly, that there are important asymmetries of 
information, and that the extent of information asymmetries is 
affected by actions of firms and individuals, has had profound 
implications for the wisdom inherited from the past, and has 
provided explanations of economic and social phenomena that 
otherwise would be hard to understand. . . .52 
. . . . 
. . .  [E]ven small information costs can have large 
consequences, and many of the standard results—including the 
welfare theorems—do not hold even when there are small 
imperfections of information.  While one of the standard informal 
arguments for decentralization using the price system is its 
                                                 
51 See, e.g., STEPHEN J. CHOI & A. C. PRITCHARD, SECURITIES REGULATION:  CASES AND ANALYSIS 22 
(2d ed. 2008) (“The primary goal of securities regulation in the United States is to reduce the 
informational disadvantage facing outside investors.”);  Id. at 149-237 (providing a long list of related 
SEC regulations, explanations, and cases on “Disclosure and Accuracy”). 
52 Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Contributions of the Economics of Information to Twentieth Century Economics, 115 Q.J. 
ECON. 1441, 1441 (Nov. 2000). 
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“information economy,” information economics showed that, in 
general, efficient decentralization through the price system, without 
extensive government intervention, does not result in a constrained 
Pareto optimum, that is, even taking into account the costs of 
information.53 
. . . . 
The key question is one of dynamics:  how the economy 
adapts to new information, creates new knowledge, and how that 
knowledge is disseminated, absorbed and used throughout the 
economy. 
. . . . 
Market forces also create the incentive to make noise, which 
induces price dispersions, or which induces managers to undertake 
activities that obfuscate information (thereby increasing their own 
rents).54 
D.  Game Theory, Mechanism Design, and Implementation 
Mention of “dynamics” and the “actions of firms and individuals” brings us 
to the vast body of research and literature conducted in parallel with the inquiry into 
competitive equilibrium, namely the set of mathematical tools and analytical 
techniques known broadly as game theory.55  Although a thorough discussion of 
game theory would be well beyond the scope of this article, game theory was integral 
to the development of these theories because it approaches the problem from the 
view of the players and the rules of play, their assessment of outcomes based on their 
imperfect information regarding the strategies and moves of the other players, and 
the number of sessions of play involved.56  Optimal outcomes in each state of play 
are based on a concept known as Nash equilibrium.57  “In general, a Nash 
                                                 
53 Id. at 1443-44. 
54 Id. at 1469-70. 
55 See, e.g., JOHN VON NEUMANN & OSCAR MORGENSTERN, THEORY OF GAMES AND ECONOMIC 
BEHAVIOR 1 (Princeton Univ. Press 1944). 
56 Id. at 12-13. 
57 See infra note 58 and accompanying text. 
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equilibrium is a specification of strategies—one for each individual—from which no 
individual has the incentive to deviate unilaterally.”58 
Looking back on how game theory evolved, Maskin explained that “[t]he 
theory of mechanism design can be thought of as the ‘engineering’ side of economic 
theory,” where Nash equilibrium concepts are used to determine if a desired social 
goal can be achieved through the design of social mechanism or institutions.59  He 
elaborated: 
A mechanism is an institution, procedure, or game for 
determining outcomes.  Not surprisingly, who gets to choose the 
mechanism—i.e., who is the mechanism designer—will once again, 
depend on the setting.  In the case of public goods, we normally 
think of the government providing the goods as also choosing the 
method by which the levels of provision and financing are 
determined.  Similarly, when it comes to sales of assets—where an 
auction is the typical mechanism—the asset seller often gets to call the 
shots about the rules, i.e., he is the one who chooses the auction 
format. 
. . . . 
Now, in the public framework, if the government knows at 
the outset which choice of public goods is optimal, then there is a 
simple—indeed, trivial—mechanism for achieving the optimum:  the 
government has only to pass a law mandating this outcome.  
Similarly, if the auctioneer has prior knowledge of which bidders 
value the assets the most, he can simply award them directly to those 
bidders (with or without payment).60 
 . . . . 
The work inspired by Hurwicz and others has produced a 
broad consensus among economists that von Hayek and Mises were, 
                                                 
58 Eric S. Maskin, Mechanism Design:  How to Implement Social Goals, 98 AM. ECON. REV. 567, 571 n.4 
(June 2008) (providing an overview of mechanism implementation theory when accepting the Nobel 
Prize in Economics in Sweden on December 8, 2007). 
59 Id. at 567. 
60 Id. at 568. 
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in fact, correct—the market is the “best” mechanism—in settings 
where (a) there are large numbers of buyers and sellers, so that no 
single agent has significant market power; and (b) there are no 
significant externalities, that is, an agent’s consumption, production, 
and information do not affect others’ production or consumption.  
However, mechanisms improving the market are generally possible if 
either assumption is violated.61 
Maskin’s co-recipient of the Nobel Prize for Economics, Roger Myerson, 
spoke contemporaneously and traced the history of inquiry into incentive 
mechanisms to communicate information:62 
A coordination mechanism is a plan for how social decisions 
should depend on people’s reported information, and changing the 
coordination mechanism in a society effectively changes the game 
that its members will play.  Given the information, preferences, and 
resources that people have in a society, different social coordination 
mechanisms could yield different games, each of which could have 
many different equilibria.  But remarkably, the set of all possible 
equilibria of all possible games can be simply characterized by using 
the revelation principle . . . [whereby a] feasible set essentially coincides 
with the set of incentive-compatible mechanisms, which satisfy certain 
incentive constraints.  These incentive constraints express the basic fact 
that individuals will not share private information or exert hidden 
efforts without appropriate incentives.63 
. . . . 
. . .  To decide whether we have a good social institution, we 
want to ask how it performs in this communication and coordination 
role.  If we do not like the performance of our current institutions, 
then we may want to reform them, to get an institution that 
implements some desired social plan, where a social plan is a 
                                                 
61 Id. at 572. 
62 Roger B. Myerson, Perspectives on Mechanism Design in Economic Theory, 98 AM. ECON. REV. 586, 586-87 
(June 2008) (providing an overview of mechanism design and the tension between adverse selection 
and moral hazard when accepting the Nobel Prize in Economics in Sweden on December 8, 2007). 
63 Id. at 587. 
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description of how everyone’s actions should depend on everyone’s 
information.64 
. . . . 
. . .  A feasible social coordination plan could be implemented 
by many different social institutions, but it is helpful to begin by 
considering a very centralized institution where every individual 
communicates separately and confidentially with a trustworthy central 
mediator. 
. . . . 
First, to the extent that our social plan depends on 
individuals’ private information that is hard for others to observe, we 
need to give people an incentive to share their information honestly.  
This problem of getting people to share information honestly is 
called adverse selection.  Second, to the extent that our social plan 
requires people to choose hidden actions and exert efforts that are 
hard for others to monitor, we need to give people an incentive to act 
obediently according to the plan.  This problem of getting people to 
act obediently to a social plan is called moral hazard.  If it is a rational 
equilibrium for everyone to be honest and obedient to the central 
mediator who is implementing our social coordination plan, then we 
say the plan is incentive compatible. 
. . .  [A]lthough we defined incentive compatibility by thinking 
about honesty and obedience in communication with a central 
mediator, in fact these incentive-compatible plans characterize 
everything that can be implemented by rational equilibrium behavior 
in any social institution or mechanism.  This assertion of generality is 
called the revelation principle.65 
Eh voila!  All we have to do is design and implement reforms to our incentive 
mechanisms and institutions governing banking and securities such that actors 
rationally share information honestly and are honest and obedient.  That done, we 
can move on to solve global warming—but before we buy a new set of snow skis, we 
                                                 
64 Id. 
65 Id. at 588. 
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might want to consider human nature, competition, and incentives to win, taking our 
analysis to actual institutions and the legal infrastructure in which we design and 
implement these rule sets of incentive compatible mechanisms.  Thereafter, we can 
analyze the results of the adjustments and modifications to approximate the 
“incentive compatible” ideal balance—a dynamic process subject to the limitations 
of real institutions and vulnerable to the law of unintended consequences.   
This proposal takes for granted that we are less than satisfied with the 
performance of our current institutional mechanisms, and want to reform them, but 
we do not want to abandon our belief in individual liberties and free markets.  For 
that, we turn to a legal analysis. 
III.  LEGAL FOUNDATION  
How we go about developing these incentive compatible institutions and 
mechanisms deserves some discussion.  Some procedures or rules are described long 
in advance, such as procedures or rules established in constitutions.  The framers of 
the United States Constitution were mechanism designers.66  In addition, when we 
speak of a “central mediator,” we are undoubtedly referring to the “government.”67  
The government, however, is not a monolithic actor:  it has three distinct branches at 
both federal and state levels, in addition to numerous levels of local government 
authority.  Moreover, there are additional hierarchies and regulatory authorities 
within those branches.  In discussing banking and securities, this article will simplify 
matters by focusing only on the federal government.  However, it is impossible to 
lump the three branches of federal government together and retain the degree of 
completeness needed to explore incentive compatibility and mechanism design 
reform in the securities and banking fields. 
Using a systems perspective, this section offers a simplified view of how laws 
are formed, implemented, and adjudicated in a dynamic process involving social 
choice theory, and feedback—much like genetic adaptation in natural systems that 
optimize heuristically through learning, trial, and error.68  Breaking the overall system 
                                                 
66 See Maskin, supra note 58, at 568 (“In the case of national political elections, by contrast, a 
mechanism is an electoral procedure, e.g. plurality rule, run-off voting, or the like.  Morevoer the 
procedure is ordinarily prescribed long in advance, indeed sometimes by the country’s constitution.  
Thus, here we should think of the framers of the constitution as the mechanism designers.”). 
67 Id. (“[I]n the public framework, if the government knows at the outset which choice of public 
goods is optimal, then there is a simple—indeed, trivial—mechanism for achieving the optimum:  the 
government only has to pass a law mandating this outcome.”). 
68 See, e.g., RALPH W. PIKE, OPTIMIZATION FOR ENGINEERING SYSTEMS 5, 304 (Van 
Nostrand Reinhold Co. 1986) (1935) (“Dynamic programming converts a large, complicated 
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into the stages of formation, implementation, and adjudication, the law can be seen 
in a dynamic programming context through which we can explore the questions of 
system optimality, mechanism design, and implementation.69 
                                                                                                                                     
optimization problem into a series of interconnected smaller ones, each containing only a 
few variables.  The result is a series of partial optimizations requiring a reduced effort to find 
the optimum, even though some of the variables may have to be enumerated throughout 
their range. . . .  Then, the dynamic programming algorithm can be applied to the find the 
optimum of the entire process by using the connected partial optimizations of the smaller 
problems.”); Lynn M. LoPucki, The Systems Approach to Law, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 479, 481 
(1997) (“‘Systems analysis’ is a methodology developed in the fields of engineering, business 
information systems, and computer programming specifically to manage complexity.  
Instead of screening complexity out, the systems analyst attempts to accommodate as much 
complexity as possible.  A comprehensive description of the system’s functioning is a 
precondition to the analysis.  Abstraction is employed sparingly, and, in the kind of systems 
analysis that is advocated in this Article, every concept is operationalized, so that every 
proposition can be tested empirically.  Systems analysis proceeds by identifying systems, 
discovering their goals or attributing goals to them, mapping their subsystems and the 
functions each performs, determining their internal structures, depicting them with attention 
paid to efficiency of presentation, and searching for internal inconsistencies.  These methods 
generate analytical power by increasing the number of goals, elements, and circumstances 
that the analyst can take into account simultaneously. These methods also provide a language 
by which to express the kinds of relationships that are commonly encountered.”); id. at 485 
(“Systems analysis regards systems as goal-seeking.  That is, systems analysis regards each 
system as having one or more purposes or functions.”); Matthew O. Jackson, Mechanism 
Theory 4-5 (Dec. 8, 2003), http://www.stanford.edu/~jacksonm/mechtheo.pdf (“A theme 
that comes out of the literature is that it is often impossible to find mechanisms compatible 
with individual incentives that simultaneously result in efficient decisions (maximizing total 
welfare), the voluntary participation of the individuals, and balanced transfers (taxes and 
subsidies that always net out across individuals).  Nevertheless, there are important settings 
where incentives and efficiency are compatible and in other settings a ‘second best’ analysis 
is still possible”); Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 476 
(1897) (Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. admonished against thinking the law could be worked 
out like a mathematical equation, but he also considered jurisprudence as “simply law in its 
most generalized part . . . [the means for which is] to follow the existing body of dogma into 
its highest generalizations by the help of jurisprudence; next, to discover from history how it 
has come to be what it is; and, finally, so far as you can, to consider the ends which the 
several rules seek to accomplish, the reasons why those ends are desired, what is given up to 
gain them, and whether they are worth the price.”). 
69 See generally Daniel J. Boyle, The Dao of Jurisprudence:  The Art and Science of Optimal Justice 
(2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Transactions:  The Tennessee Journal of Business Law). 
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A.  An Explanation of the Dynamic Model 
 
 The figure below breaks “the law” into four distinct stages, each of which is 
an elaborate decision making process:  Stage 0 is the mediation of reality.70  Stage 1 is 
the formation of law in the political and legislative process.  Stage 2 is the 
implementation of legislation through the regulatory and rulemaking process, which 
is usually performed as an executive function.  Finally, stage 3 is the adjudication 
process, where individual cases or controversies are resolved in a series of state and 
federal courts, with some cases leading to the U.S. Supreme Court.71  The process is 
interlinked and interdependent.  The nuance of each stage could be captured in 
elaborate process and substantive descriptions, but that effort would be beyond the 
scope of this article.  For present purposes, assuming that the model roughly (but 
accurately) captures the essential elements of our legal processes, we can weigh the 
performance against the objectives of the system and its sub-stages, the separate and 
common constraints affecting decisions at each stage and level within the stage, and 
how the output of one stage places boundaries on the performance of subsequent 
stages.72  This model attempts to capture our American system of jurisprudence, 
                                                 
70 Id. at 8 (explaining that reality is mediated in multiple stages in order to convert it into language). 
71 This model is based on the U.S. system of jurisprudence.  Variations would be required to describe 
the process in other countries and cultures.  See, e.g., BRIAN K. LANDBSERG & LESLIE GIELOW 
JACOBS, GLOBAL ISSUES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (West 2007).  That said, there is no reason that 
U.S. style incentives and regulations are not compatible with those of Europe even though the details 
of parliamentary process and code based legal regimes (as opposed to common law) create differences 
in practice.  One could even develop a system description based on other models, like that which 
exists in contemporary China, with a dominant and singular authority under the Communist party, but 
where legislation evolves toward approval in what leaders there call “democracy within the party.”  
17th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, 2007:  Planning China’s Next Five Years, 
CPC Inner Party Democracy:  Theory Practice and Institutionalization, 
http://www.china.org.cn/english/congress/228201.htm.  Skeptical and interested readers should also 
consult RANDALL PEERENBOOM, CHINA’S LONG MARCH TOWARD RULE OF LAW (2002); DANIEL 
C.K. CHOW, THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (West 2003). 
72 To understand the impact of a given stage and process on subsequent stages and overall 
performance, imagine a power plant, with a fuel processing system, a boiler, a turbine, a generator, 
and an electrical substation.  Our objective as a society is to optimize the transformation of the energy 
in the fuel into a form useful for people, widely disbursed through the electricity grid at a minimum 
cost and with a minimum of impact on the environment.  The plant is subject to countless 
constraints:  air pollution limits, noise levels, hours of operation, community setting, access to water 
sources, etc.  Each level of the system has efficiency implications for the overall transformation 
process.  Practical (cost constrained designs) efficiencies of boilers are in the 90% area, but a turbine’s 
ability to extract work energy from steam is in the upper 30% regime.  Generators and substations are 
each in the upper 90% ballpark, while transmission systems vary based on numerous factors.  Each of 
these stages needs to be optimized independently, but due to their interconnected nature, the best the 
overall system can perform is around 30%.  Alternatively, consider the human body which needs air, 
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premised on the United States Constitution; although, adaptation for other systems 
could lead to corollary conclusions.  The Constitution had multiple objectives:  to 
establish and define the role and function of government, to define the interaction 
between the federal and state governments, and to lay out several basic principles 
regarding individual liberty.73  As that document and its creators attempted to 
balance competing and multiple objectives while constrained in their efforts by their 
own limitations, time pressures and politics, the Constitution is commonly 
understood by Americans as the optimal symbol of democracy and legitimacy. 
Stage 1
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food and water to exist.  To the extent that the lungs and the digestive track fail to perform their 
functions, the performance of the heart and circulation system are affected, ultimately diminishing the 
performance of the brain and nervous system.  Too much or too little at any stage affects the overall 
performance; limits exist at all levels. 
73 See, e.g, NORMAN REDLICH, JOHN ATTANASIO & JOEL K. GOLDSTEIN, UNDERSTANDING 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 4-5 (3d ed. 2005) (commenting on the enormous undertaking of the framers 
who sought to protect individual liberty while empowering the government to respond to public 
needs.  Quoting James Madison from The Federalist No. 51, “If men were angels, no government 
would be necessary.  If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on 
government would be necessary.  In framing a government which is to be administered by men over 
men, the great difficulty lies in this:  You must first enable the government to control the governed, 
and in the next place oblige it to control itself.”). 
2009] GREENSPAN’S LAMENT 223
 
The above systems depiction provides a framework within which we can 
map the underlying dynamics of how laws are formed in one stage of the process by 
a group of actors with their own set of objectives.  Then, the laws are implemented 
through multiple executive branch agencies that have another set of bureaucratic 
incentives and motivations.  Finally, these laws are adjudicated within the context of 
particular cases and controversies involving individual factual circumstances by a 
multi-tiered set of judicial authorities, constrained at each stage by different rules and 
considerations.  What is worse, within our system of democracy we impose the rule 
that decisions and rules cannot be made by a dictator.  According to social choice 
theory and the Arrow Impossibility Theorem as well as the work of Sen and others, 
we are reminded that we cannot always achieve every goal.74 
Sen may have been thinking about the complex mess of banking regulations 
and its inscrutable interconnection to securities rules when he accepted the Nobel 
Prize in 1998 with these remarks: 
“A camel,” it has been said, “is a horse designed by a 
committee.”  This might sound like a telling example of the terrible 
deficiencies of committee decisions, but it is really much too mild of 
an indictment.  A camel may not have the speed of a horse, but it is a 
very useful animal—well coordinated to travel distances without food 
or water.  A committee that tries to reflect the diverse wishes of its 
different members in designing a horse could easily end up with 
something far less congruous:  perhaps a centaur of Greek 
mythology, half a horse and half something else—a mercurial 
creation combining savagery with confusion.75 
To push the use of metaphor, when we speak of how the law evolves, we 
often use genetic or evolutionary references, and frankly, some babies are ugly.76  
                                                 
74 Amartya Sen, The Possibility of Social Choice, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 349, 351 (June 1999); see also William 
T. Mayton, The Possibilities of Collective Choice:  Arrow’s Theorem, Article I, and the Delegation of Legislative 
Power to Administrative Agencies, 1986 DUKE L. J. 948, 948 (1986) (decrying the fact that delegation of 
authority to modern administrative agencies as “technocratic governance” to get around Arrow’s 
dictatorship constraint); see KENNETH ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (1963))  
(This theory shows that in the formation stage of the law, an individual’s optimal value outcomes are 
unachievable.  “Collective rationality in the social choice mechanism is not merely an illegitimate 
transfer from the individual to society but an important attribute of a genuinely democratic system 
capable of fully adapting to a varying environment.”).  Id. at 120 
75 Sen, supra note 74, at 351. 
76 Scholars of banking law and Title 12 of the U.S.C. should agree, but more seriously, by addressing 
the stages of the above model independently and recognizing that they are interlinked through the 
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What we have in the formation and implantation of mechanisms, far from those 
circumstances where theorists can devise a Nash Equilibrium solution, is a never 
ending dynamic game.  The game is characterized by multiple actors whose actions 
are interdependent and affect each other like externalities—their own motives and 
strategies represent a complex mix of adverse selection and moral hazard.  Our legal 
structure and its evolutionary and dynamic responses are ill-suited to self-correct 
when short term external pressures threaten systemic collapse. 
The legislative and regulatory dynamic responses are also ill-matched to that 
of market participants in the real game of the economy.  Market participants trade in 
real time, with as much information as is available, and (presumably) based on a 
rational assessment of the impact of events on values.  In a steady state situation, 
their trading leads to some fundamental fluctuations in prices, a sine wave type 
periodic function whose frequency and period vary according to the underlying asset 
and the dynamics of the industry.77  These periodic fluctuations are superimposed 
upon trends of the underlying variables, such as interest rate tendencies, inflation, 
growth rates, and a host of industry specific supply and demand variables.78  These 
trend variables can be in line or out of line with the underlying periodic changes, and 
their own periodicity between inversions can vary.79  But when a shock occurs that 
affects all of the participants instantaneously, it throws this ebb and flow into chaos, 
and a fractal pattern emerges and dominates prices.80  If this shock is large enough, it 
                                                                                                                                     
evolving state variable labeled “the law,” one can begin to see how variations in the return function 
(objective) and constraints at each stage affect not only the stage’s performance but also the 
performance of the integrated system.  Through the dynamic process, over time, with feedback, and 
with society’s evolving views of morality to mediate reality, “the law” evolves dynamically.  This 
evolution mirrors genetic evolution, and this trend is clearly seen in the way U.S. Supreme Court cases 
evolve around the optimization of different principles through generations of cases.  For instance, we 
can trace the evolution of the Supreme Court’s resolution of the inherent conflict between individual 
freedom to contract with a state’s rights to regulate economic behavior in a series of cases from 
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 49 (1905) (holding in a divided opinion that interference with the 
freedom of parties to contract with each other violates the Constitution) and its progeny to Williamson 
v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., 348, 491 U.S. 483 (1955) (rejecting the logic of Lochner and establishing 
the rational basis test to determine the validity of statutes governing economic activity). 
77 See, e.g., SIMON WREN-LEWIS & REBECCA L. DRIVER,  REAL EXCHANGE RATES FOR THE YEAR 
2000 (Institute for International Economics 1998) (explaining the various time domains of 
fundamentals, trends, and short term effects in the case of currencies). 
78 Id. 
79 EDGAR E PETERS, FRACTAL MARKET ANALYSIS:  APPLYING CHAOS THEORY TO INVESTMENT 
AND ECONOMICS (1994) (offering the Fractal Market Hypothesis as an alternative to the Efficient 
Market Hypothesis) 
80 Id. 
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can create a herding effect, pushing the underlying system to a tipping point.81  This 
phenomenon mirrors natural systems, and it is characteristic of many organized 
social systems.82 
For the current crisis, Peters’s comments provide helpful insight: 
Liquidity is not the same as trading volume.  The largest 
crashes have occurred when there has been low liquidity but high 
trading volume.  Another name for low liquidity could be imbalanced 
trading volume.   
The EMH [Efficient Market Hypothesis] says nothing about 
liqudity.  It says that prices are always fair when liquidity exists or not, 
or, alternatively, that there is always enough liquidity.  Thus, the 
EMH cannot explain crashes and stampedes; when liquidity vanishes, 
getting a “fair” price may not be as important as completing the trade 
at any cost. 
A stable market is not the same as an “efficient” market, as 
defined by the EMH.  A stable market is a liquid market.  If the 
market is liquid, then the price can be considered close to “fair.”  
However, markets are not always liquid.  When lack of liquidity 
strikes, participating investors are willing to take any price they can, 
fair or not.83  
                                                 
81 Id. 
82 See, e.g., BENOIT B. MANDELBROT, FRACTALS AND SCALING IN FINANCE:  DISCONTINUITY, 
CONCENTRATION AND RISK (Springer 1997) (explaining how memory of recent events affects 
decisions and leads to the need to use non Gaussian statistics and mathematics to describe financial 
functions). 
83 PETERS, supra note 79, at 42. 
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B.  An Illustration84 
The process of advocating regulation and deregulation and then gaming the 
loopholes in a given actor’s best short-term interest is not a new phenomenon.  
Government involvement and oversight of the banking industry has been an integral 
part of U.S. jurisprudence and politics since the beginning of the Republic.85  In 
McCulloch v. Maryland, the Supreme Court asserted the supremacy of the federal 
regulatory role over the states in regulating banking when it barred Maryland from 
interfering or inhibiting in the operation of the Second Bank of The United States.86  
Andrew Jackson vetoed a law to re-charter the Second Bank of the United States in 
1832, leading states to over-issue bank notes and credit, which ultimately caused the 
collapse of hundreds of state banks during the depression of 1837.87 
Since then, the courts have periodically faced questions over the 
government’s role in regulating commerce through the operation of banks.88  
Deregulation of interest accounts and deposits under the Depository Institutions 
Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 was influenced by nonbank 
                                                 
84 This section uses banking regulations to illustrate the general points raised above, but similar 
illustrations could be found in the regulation and re-regulation of transportation, electric utilities, 
natural gas, and other industries.  For example, witness ENRON’s behavior following the Energy 
Policy Act of 1992 and the national move to deregulate the electricity sector, leading to the 
Congressional response of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the related wave of litigation over ENRON’s 
gaming behavior as it related to the California energy crisis early in this decade.  See, e.g., Jeffrey D. 
Van Niel, Enron—The Primer, in ENRON:  CORPORATE FIASCOS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS 3 
(Rapoport and Dharan, eds. 2003) (describing Enron’s game playing schemes which they labeled as 
Death Star, Fat Boy, Ricochet, Load Shift, and others in California); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. 
Credit Suisse First Boston (U.S.A.), Inc., 482 F.3d 372, 377, 393 (5th Cir. 2007) (describing Enron’s 
deceptive schemes but failing to find liability for the witting investment bankers who acquiesced 
silently). 
85 See MICHAEL P. MALLOY, BANKING AND FINANCIAL SERVICES LAW:  CASES, MATERIALS, AND 
PROBLEMS 13 (2nd ed. 2005) (explaining that the first Bank of the United States was a “quasi-
governmental banking entity designed to regulate or control the supply of credit and currency, and to 
monitor and facilitate transactions in credit and currency” and that it was developed after President 
Washington mediated a debate among Hamilton, Jefferson, and Madison over the Constitutionality of 
Congressional power to establish such a bank.  It ran for twenty years until its Charter expired in 
1811). 
86 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 324-25 (1819) (holding the Supreme Court had ultimate 
authority to interpret the Constitution and that Congress had the power to incorporate the Bank of 
the United States despite the fact its formation was not an explicitly enumerated power). 
87 MALLOY, supra note 85, at 18-19. 
88 Id. at 1-81; see, e.g., id. at 25-27 (illustrating that between 1913 and 2001, Congress passed some 
thirty-seven acts to regulate and re-regulate banks and commerce).  
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competition in demand deposits, and it led to new products for the savings and loan 
industry.89  The widespread failure of the saving and loan institutions ultimately cost 
the U.S. taxpayers some $90 billion.90  In each of these cycles, Congress responded to 
perceived market failures, and the market actors reacted by restructuring and 
reinvesting in the perceived opportunities to profit.  This led to market failures and 
bank losses, which led to more regulation, deregulation, and re-regulation. 
Greenspan’s worldview is based on a paradigm integral to democratic society 
and institutions:  the freedom to contract, the recognition of private property rights, 
and limited government interference to allow competition to determine outcomes.  
These views have been supported for centuries as the bedrock of efficiency and 
utility in democratic market societies.91  So, who wins when banks compete?  
American society considers this question to be rhetorical.  As LendingTree.com 
notes in its corporate trademark:  “When banks compete, you [the consumer] 
wins.”92 
But can you win if we all lose?  Isn’t the invisible hand of the market the way 
to optimal outcomes for society?  “Deregulation” supposes so—yet a prime suspect 
as the origin of the current mortgage foreclosure crisis is the Gramm-Leach-Bliley 
Act of 1999, which explicitly deregulated commercial and investment banks to allow 
them to combine forces and eliminated many of the provisions of the Glass-Steagall 
Act of 1933.93  The Glass-Steagall Act had been a principal reform of the Great 
Depression and its banking crisis, and the act specifically prohibited common 
ownership, control, and product offerings between investment and commercial 
                                                 
89 MALLOY, supra note 85, at 60-76. 
90 JERRY W. MARKHAM & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, CORPORATE FINANCE:  CASES AND MATERIALS 30 
(Thompson West 2008) (2004) (“When real estate values collapsed at the end of the 1980s, all of the 
problems that had been building in the S&Ls were exposed and hundreds of S&Ls failed.  A majority 
of the distressed thrift associations were in California and Texas.  In 1987, the S&L industry lost some 
$7 billion.  In 1988, over 700 banks and over 1,000 S&Ls were being closed down.  Costs to taxpayers 
from the failed S&Ls were predicted to range from $500 billion to $1 trillion.  One Congressional 
subcommittee called the S&L crisis ‘the greatest financial fiasco the United States has ever seen.’  
Regulators estimated that forty percent of the thrift failures were due to fraud or insider abuse.  By 
1992, some 1,000 individuals had been charged with crimes in connection with S&L activities. . . .  
The final cost to American taxpayers for the S&L crisis proved to be much less than originally 
estimated, but still totaled at least $90 billion.”). 
91 See, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE (1983); ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF 
NATIONS (1776). 
92 Lending Tree Home Loans, http://www.lendingtree.com/ (last visited Jan. 20, 2009). 
93 Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (1933). 
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banking interests.94  Advocates of Gramm-Leach-Bliley believed that Glass-Steagall 
was outmoded and that banks needed the freedom to offer the same services as 
investment banks in order to compete and survive.95 
Was there a causal link between the passage of Gramm-Leach-Bliley in 1999 
and the subprime lending of recent years?  If so, were there regulators who 
understood the history and should have known better?  In fairness, by the time 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley passed, the integration of financial and banking services had 
progressed dramatically.96  Undoubtedly, there were numerous competitive factors 
that pushed lending institutions in the race to the bottom along the primrose path we 
now find ourselves:  simplifying the application process for loans to only checking 
credit scores, lowering the threshold of which scores would qualify, offering 100% 
and higher loan to value ratios (because real estate—presumably—would never 
decline in value), and providing subprime initial interest rates to capture the loan.  It 
is rational to infer from this competitive behavior that banks intended to make up 
losses on individual loans by making more loans and charging hidden fees, or by 
simply passing the risk of default along through the bundling process.  These 
competitive pressures were only amplified when co-owned commercial and 
investment banks began using the secondary market to shift the risk of these loans 
immediately to a broader market through the syndication process of bundling the 
mortgages into mortgage-backed securities and selling them to pension funds, 
                                                 
94 Glass-Steagall Act of 1933:  Definition from Answers.com, http://www.answers.com/topic/glass-
steagall-act-of-1933 (last visited Jan. 20, 2009) (“Many economic and political factors led to the 
financial crisis that began in 1929, but the general breakdown of the U.S. banking system during the 
period from 1929 to 1932 certainly played a significant role in the crisis. It was this systemic failure 
that led Congress to review and reform the Federal Reserve System and the national banking system 
as well. In particular, the Banking Act of 1933, known as the Glass-Steagall Act (GSA) (48 Stat. 162), 
made several significant changes in the federal regulation of banks. Primary among these was the 
separation of commercial banking from investment banking.”); see also Reem Heakal, What Was the 
Glass-Steagall Act?, http://www.investopedia.com/articles/03/071603.asp?viewall=1 (last visited 
August 3, 2008) (explaining the rationale behind the restrictions between commercial and investment 
banks in the Glass-Steagall Act and the supreme court decisions leading to the modifications in the 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act). 
95Terry S. Schwakopf, Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act:  A New Frontier in Financial Services, FEDERAL RESERVE 
BANK OF SAN FRANSISCO, http://www.frbsf.org/publications/banking/gramm/ (last visited August 
2, 2008).  
96 See MALLOY, supra note 85, for a discussion of several regulatory rulings and court cases allowing 
banks to compete in the financial services industry prior to the passage of Gramm-Leach-Bliley. 
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sovereign wealth funds, and other banks.97  In the jargon of the day, the banks were 
selling hats to each other. 
Title 12, Part 560 of the Code of Federal Regulations covers Banks and 
Banking, Lending and Investment.  Generally, there are three categories of mortgage 
financing: 
1. Conforming or Conventional Loans:  These loans are for credit-
qualifying borrowers who own and occupy the real estate, are not past due on child 
support, and meet individual loan guidelines.  The financing is for residences, and the 
borrower pays a down payment ranging from at least five to twenty percent.98 
2. Alt-A Loans:  This kind of loan occurs when the bank lends money 
to persons based on reduced documentation of income and assets (“stated income,” 
“stated assets,” or “no income verification”), where the debt to income is above 
conforming standards, where the credit history has problems that don’t quite rise to 
subprime loan levels but are not good enough for a conforming loan, or where the 
loan to value ratio or occupancy is non-conforming.99  These loans were less likely to 
be picked up by the secondary market and carried considerably higher risk.100  The 
IndyMac collapse, estimated to cost the Federal Deposit Insurance Fund between $4 
billion and $8 billion, occurred because much of IndyMac’s portfolio was built on 
Alt-A loans requiring little evidence of buyer income or assets.101 
                                                 
97 See, e.g., Michael P. Malloy, The Subprime Mortgage Crisis and Bank Regulation, 27 BANKING & FIN. 
SERVICES POL’Y REP. 1 (2008), reprinted in MICHAEL P. MALLOY, BANKING AND FINANCIAL SERVICES 
LAW:  CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 39 (2d ed. 2008-2009 Supp.) (providing a diagrammatic and 
systemic overview of the cyclic process from mortgage origination to debt collateralization and sale to 
institutional investors, and the cash flow returns back to originators as the engine of motivation 
propelling the process seemingly forever). 
98 See, e.g., General Loan Requirements, http:www.ahfc.state.ak.us/loans/general-requirements.cfm 
(last visited Jan. 20, 2009). 
99 See e.g., Mike Heayn, Real Estate 101:  The Next Catastrophe, SANTA MONICA DAILY PRESS, Feb. 11, 
2009, http://www.smdp.com/Articles-c-2009-02-10-48894.113116_The_next_ 
catastrophe.html (last visited April 23, 2009); see also Alt-A, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ 
Alt-A (last visited Jan. 20, 2009). 
100 Id.  
101  Catherine Clifford & Chris Isidore, The Fall of IndyMac, (July 13, 2008), 
http://money.cnn.com/2008/07/12/news/companies/indymac_fdic/index.hrtm?postversion=2008
071210. 
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3. Subprime:  “Subprime mortgage lending typically refers to a loan to 
someone whose credit history is insufficient to qualify that borrower for a ‘prime’ 
loan, such as a loan ‘conforming’ to the underwriting guidelines of Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac.  Poor credit history, including a spotty history or a record of late and 
missed payments to creditors, or a recent bankruptcy on the part of the borrower 
often qualifies the loan to be considered subprime.”102 
Subprime lending provided credit to persons who otherwise would not have 
had the opportunity to own a home.  Still, cities are now claiming lender practices 
were predatory.103  The irony is that the government wanted lenders to provide more 
opportunity to less-qualified persons.  Technology allowed for rapid application and 
decision processes, and the private sector priced in the added risk with higher fees 
and prices.  Nonetheless, there has been a state and federal consumer protection 
outcry and legal action based on legislation such as The Federal Truth in Lending 
Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1601 et seq.,104 and California’s Unfair Competition Law, California 
Civil Code section 17200.105 
As recently as late-August 2007, the effects of the subprime mortgage crisis 
on investment banks and lenders in their “race to the bottom,” where their 
competitive practices had ignored the need to price risk into their products, had not 
quite been realized.106  Moody’s rating service was still hailing the strength of the U.S. 
investment banks and the five big names:  Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, Merrill 
Lynch, Lehman Brothers, and Bear Stearns.107  By mid-September 2008, Lehman had 
failed; Merrill was bought by Bank of America; Morgan Stanley was “scrambling to 
find a buyer”; Goldman Sachs was concerned and losing value; Washington Mutual 
                                                 
102 Richard E. Gottlieb & Andrew J. McGuinness, When Bad Things Happen to Good Cities:  Are Lenders 
to Blame?, 17 BUS. L.  TODAY 13, 14 (Jul/Aug 2008). 
103 See id. at 14-15 (listing multiple examples of predatory lending lawsuits). 
104 Michael C. Tomkies, Regulating the Subprime Market:  Finding the Right Balance, 17 BUS. L.  TODAY 21, 
23 (Jul/Aug 2008). 
105 Travis P. Nelson, Trends in Subprime Lending:  Legislation, Litigation, and Enforcement on the Rise, 17 BUS. 
L.  TODAY 27 (Jul/Aug 2008). 
106 See supra note 97 and accompanying text (discussing this “race to the bottom”). 
107Jon C. Ogg, U. S. Investment Bank Ratings OK, Or So Says Moody’s, (Aug. 29, 2007) 
http://www.247wallst.com/2007/08/us-investment-b.html (“Here is a list of the major brokerage 
and investment banks in order of market capitalization that are listed as being able to absorb the 
malaise:  Goldman Sachs (GS) $70 Billion in market cap.; Morgan Stanely (MS) $63+ Billion in market 
cap.; Merrill Lynch (MER) $62 Billion in market cap.; Lehman Brothers (LEH) $29 Billion in market 
cap.; Bear Stearns (BSC) $15.7 Billion in market cap.”). 
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had put itself up for auction; and the government had propped up Bear Stearns, 
insurance giant AIG International, and the government-sponsored Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac.108  Shortly thereafter, Congress passed the Emergency Economic 
Stabilization Act (EESA) and its Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP).109 
Like his intellectual heirs more than two centuries later, in promoting the first 
Bank of the United States, Alexander Hamilton believed that private ownership and 
control would ensure the bank would behave in its own long-run interest and not be 
harmed by “public necessity.”110  In the aftermath of the subprime lending crisis, 
regulatory authorities have found it necessary to caution against “predatory lending 
considerations.”111  These authorities have reminded private lenders that 
“[f]undamental consumer protection principles relevant to the underwriting and 
marketing of mortgage loans include:  Approving loans based on the borrower’s 
ability to repay the loan according to its terms; and Providing information that 
enables consumers to understand material terms, costs, and risks of loan products at 
a time that will help the consumer select a product.”112 
What really happens when banks compete?  Clearly, some banks engage in 
predatory lending.  For example, in Chicago, an elderly, blind, and ill woman lost her 
home to foreclosure.113  Because she was unable to read what she was signing, the 
mortgage broker visited her so that she could sign the final loan agreement from her 
hospital bed.114  Later, she and her attorney waded through a continuous flow of new 
offers to refinance and take on additional credit.115  “The government, for a long 
time now, has been on the side of the great corporations, on the side of Wall Street, 
                                                 
108Christian Plumb, Morgan Stanley in Talks, Financials Slide Resumes, REUTERS (Sept. 18, 2008) 
http://www.reuters.com/article/bankingFinancial/idUSHKG9362820080918 (describing Morgan’s 
frantic search for a buyer, Goldman Sachs concerns, as well as the recent failures of AIG International 
and the auction of Washington Mutual). 
109 Emergency Economic Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 852 (2008). 
110 MALLOY, supra note 85, at 8 (citing Hamilton’s report to President Washington:  1 American State 
Papers 67, Treasury Report on a National Bank, December 13, 1790). 
111 Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Division of Banks, Statement on Sub Prime Mortgage Lending, 
Regulatory Bulletin 5.1-104, at 5 (September 10, 2007) (defining predatory lending to include either 
making loans based on collateral rather than the borrower’s ability to repay, repeatedly charging fees 
for necessary refinancing or loan flipping, or fraud or deception in concealing the loan obligation). 
112 Id. at 8. 
113 See id. 
114 See id. 
115 See id. 
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on the side of the financial services industry.  So who looks out for the little 
people?”116  It seems clear that we need regulations to control these externalities, but 
the exact nature is more elusive. 
For its part, on July 14, 2008, the Federal Reserve issued its final rule 
prohibiting lenders from making loans without taking into account the borrower’s 
ability to repay the loan, requiring borrowers to verify their income and assets, 
banning prepayment penalties if the payment can change in the first four years, and 
requiring creditors to establish escrow accounts for taxes and homeowners’ 
insurance for all first-lien mortgage loans.117  The rules also protect real estate 
secured loans by prohibiting creditors and mortgage brokers from coercing 
appraisers into misstating a home’s value and from pyramiding late fees and by 
requiring lenders to provide good faith estimates of costs and payment amounts.118   
Like Greenspan, a fine financial mind like Hamilton’s might find it incredible 
that the government would need to remind private actors of these common sense 
principles and that it would take laws and regulations like these to govern such 
behavior.  But then again, Hamilton never got a mortgage from Countrywide.  What 
motivations and incentive mechanisms led the attorneys and executives at the 
mortgage lenders, credit swap counter parties, insurers, and investment bankers to 
game the system and put so much at risk in their quest for returns?  More 
importantly, what regulatory structures allowed it to happen, and what changes are 
needed to correct the deficiencies? 
The current crisis shows us that policy matters.  As stated by Professor 
Malloy:   
The 1999 Graham-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) is one of the most 
significant pieces of federal banking legislation since the Banking Act 
of 1933 itself.  Among other things, it works a fundamental change in 
the scheme of regulation of securities activities of depository 
institutions.  The GLBA eliminates prohibitions on affiliations 
between commercial and investment banking enterprises and on 
interlocking directorates between such enterprises by repealing 
                                                 
116 Interview by Bill Boyers with Bob Herbert (Aug. 8, 2008), available at http://www.pbs.org/ 
moyers/journal/08082008/transcript4.html. 
117 Press Release, Federal Reserve (July 14, 2008), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/ 
newsevents/press/bcreg/20080714a.htm. 
118 Id. 
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sections 20 and 32 of Glass-Steagall.  It also authorizes national 
banks to deal in, underwrite, and purchase municipal bonds for their 
own investment accounts.119 
Through the evolution of products and changes in the financial industry, the 
pressures of competition had eroded the prophylactic separation between 
commercial banking and investment banking found in Glass-Steagall.120  Early on, 
however, after the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”) had allowed 
the First National City Bank of New York to establish and operate collective 
investment funds, the Supreme Court drew the line in Investment Co. Institute v. 
Camp.121  Speaking for the Court, Justice Stewart interpreted Congress’s original 
rationale in separating investment banking activities from those of commercial 
banking: 
The failure of the Bank of the United States in 1930 was widely 
attributed to that bank’s activities with respect to its numerous 
securities affiliates.  Moreover, Congress was concerned that 
commercial banks in general and member banks of the Federal 
Reserve System in particular had both aggravated and been damaged 
by stock market decline partly because of their direct and indirect 
involvement in the trading and ownership of speculative securities.  
The Glass-Steagall Act reflected a determination that policies of 
competition, convenience, or expertise which might otherwise 
support the entry of commercial banks into the investment banking 
business were outweighed by the ‘hazards’ and ‘financial dangers’ that 
arise when commercial banks engage in the activities proscribed by 
the Act.   
The hazards that Congress had in mind were not limited to 
the obvious danger that a bank might invest its own assets in frozen 
or otherwise imprudent stock or security investments. . . .  The 
legislative history of the Glass-Steagall Act shows that Congress also 
had in mind and repeatedly focused on the more subtle hazards that 
                                                 
119 MALLOY, supra note 85, at 553. 
120 See id. at 398-488 (providing an exposition of this evolution). 
121 Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617 (1971) (denying the ability of national banks to engage 
in collective investment funds as securities despite the OCC’s administrative view because Congress 
had clearly expressed a series of subtle concerns in stating the purpose of the prohibitions in Glass-
Steagall).  
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arise when a commercial bank goes beyond the business of acting as 
fiduciary or managing agent and enters the investment banking 
business either directly or by establishing an affiliate to hold and sell 
particular investments. . . .  122 
Before the passage of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act made the above quoted 
opinion moot, the prophylactic prohibition against common ownership between 
commercial and investment banking continued to hold.  In 1984, in Securities Industries 
Ass’n v. Board of Governors,123 the Court affirmed the “subtle risks created by mixing 
the two activities justified a strong prophylaxis,” and the Court used the Glass-
Steagall Act to strike down an effort by Bankers Trust to place commercial paper for 
corporate customers.124  However, after remand and in a later opinion in a lower 
court, Judge Bork inexplicably converted the string of subtle hazards into a judicial 
test.125  He then used the test to let stand an administrative revision stating that the 
same sale of commercial paper did not take Bankers Trust into the realm of 
investment banking.126  The rest, shall we say, is history. 
IV.  SUMMARY 
1. The notion of “competitive equilibrium,” used to prove the 
conclusion that price and freedom to contract in a market system provide for the 
most efficient allocation of resources in the economy, is a myth—it is the equivalent 
of the “reasonable person” standard in the law.  Though it provides a vital 
benchmark, it does not actually exist.  The market is never in equilibrium because the 
conditions of equilibrium are never met in practice.  Regulatory responses are a 
dynamic phenomenon, and market actors react to those responses.  This process 
then loops back on itself.  Participants take their grievances over the impact of the 
changes to the courts for “justice,” and the laws and regulations are adjudicated, 
                                                 
122 Id. at 629-634.  The opinion goes on to list and explain these subtle hazards, which include 
promotional pressure, new temptations, impairment to public confidence due to the reputation effects 
in the public mind if investments turn sour, pressure to make its credit facilities available to firms 
whose securities it sells, pressure to provide issuers with unsound loans, and ultimately, concern that 
depositors are put at risk by these relationships and activities.  Id. 
123 Sec. Indus. Ass’n v. Bd. of Governors, 468 U.S. 137 (1984). 
124 Id. at 148. 
125 Sec. Indus. Ass’n v. Bd. of Governors, 807 F.2d 1052 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1005 
(1987). 
126 Id. 
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providing further incentive to modify behavior and impetus for further regulatory 
change. 
2. The notion of competitive equilibrium, despite its merely theoretical 
existence, provides a useful benchmark to avoid wasteful allocations of resources.  
Several assumptions, including (a) the absence of externalities, (b) information 
asymmetry, and (c) rational behavior of the actors, are required in defining the 
notion of competitive equilibrium. 
3. When confronted with changes in their environment due to the 
emergence of new techniques, technologies, or even regulatory changes, firms and 
individuals are free to buy, sell, or transact to reduce their costs.  Demsetz and Coase 
reveal that at times regulatory changes motivate these adjustments.  Regulations 
prompt actors to change their property boundaries to adjust their transaction costs 
and internalize the benefit created by the new regulations.  This process of 
adjustment and internalization of benefits reveals that regulations themselves are a 
form of externality to any given firm.  From a system-wide perspective, those who 
create laws and regulations are themselves players in a game-theoretic context.  
Mechanism design principles attempt to optimize the performance of these 
regulatory distortions of competitive equilibrium. 
4. The revelation principle, the design and implementation of coordination 
mechanisms to serve as incentives to encourage firms and persons to simultaneously 
share information and to act honestly and obediently, is internal to a system of social 
choice and the process of formation, execution, and adjudication of laws and 
regulations.  As such, like any system, it is subject to a set of optimization constraints 
and limitations.  Among those are the constructs of social choice theories such as the 
Arrow Impossibility Theorem and capture theory. 
5. The dynamic gaming response of those within the system of 
incentive mechanisms can create imbalances that are not always predictable, but its 
quantitative consequence can be monitored and detected.  Players who have 
developed techniques to detect these consequences, such as hedge fund “quants,” 
have learned to benefit speculatively. 
6. The assumption of self-interested actors who behave rationally in 
making their choices and decisions survives once we allow for the presence of 
externalities in the form of regulatory incentives that create lacuna that allow them to 
reorganize, internalize benefits, and externalize risks that influence their choices; 
dynamic responses that reflect imperfect and imperfectly assimilated information; 
and the reality that our individual rationality is bound by these factors as well as the 
limited time we have to make decisions, the analytical framework, the ideology and 
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biases we bring to the decision, and our ability to incorporate the changing effects of 
all these factors on the decisions of the other players. 
7. Complex, interdependent, and dynamic problems rarely have 
discoverable equilibrium solutions.127  Real processes cannot achieve ideal results.  
Thus, the best dynamic strategy for all players within this complex framework is a 
heuristic strategy, which means that it adjusts and learns as facts and rule sets change 
within a general set of boundaries—specifically, the rules of a civil society. 
8. As an illustration and as applied to the current crisis, the ideology of 
encouraging competition and privatization manifested itself in ways that allowed 
actors to organize in order to minimize transaction costs and internalize benefits 
(grow revenues through the fees collected from the sale of subprime mortgages and 
derivative credit instruments) while externalizing costs and risks of downturn and 
default—for example, through the collateralization of mortgage-backed securities 
and naked shorts on credit default swaps. 
9. In terms of the current regulatory structure, after the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act, the policy objectives of banking—safety and soundness of depository 
institutions—can be at odds with those of securities regulations—risking disclosure 
to allow investors the freedom to make informed, if risky, investment decisions.  
This is because the disclosure of news that triggers rapid and illiquid market reactions 
and movement can turn into fractal and self-reinforcing behavior that would 
undermine safety and soundness. 
10. Aside from immediate measures to stem the decline in underlying 
asset prices in housing, regulatory policy prescriptions in recognition of these 
constraints, and the need for measures to protect the system from collapse, 
regulators need to include prophylactic prohibitions to prevent further 
                                                 
127 CHRISTOPHER ENGEL & GERD GIGERENZER, HEURISTICS AND THE LAW 1-16 (MIT Press 2006) 
(“Heuristics are needed in situations where the world does not permit optimization.  For many real-
world problems (as opposed to optimization tuned textbook problems), optimal solutions are 
unknown because problems are computationally intractable or poorly defined. . . . Heuristics may be 
of help in making new laws.  In civil countries, the ordinary mechanism for this is legislation.  
Consequently, the design of new law is best done by understanding political process.  A standard 
model from political science, the policy cycle, helps do that.  It structures an often messy chain of 
events into five steps:  agenda setting, problem definition, policy choice, implementation, and 
evaluation (May and Wildavsky 1978).  Each step is heavily influenced by the heuristics of those 
contributing to the legislation.  Finally, the process of rule application can capitalize of heuristics.  Yet 
the heuristics of judges and administrators can also be seen as a problem by the legislator, or by the 
scientific observers of the legal order.”). 
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contamination of the safety and soundness of depository institutions from the 
profitable sale of securities whose risk has been socialized. 
V.  WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? 
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act is a fact of life at this point.  We cannot turn 
the clock back, but as we seek to make regulatory adjustments, we should remember 
the lessons of history.  The need to preserve the safety and soundness of banking 
and confidence in depository institutions, which was the purpose of banking 
regulation, at times stands in contrast to the more nuanced and factually-specific 
concerns of investments and securities regulation, designed not to inhibit risk taking 
ventures but to force disclosure of that risk to enable investors to decide. 
Applying these two policy objectives to today’s situation, where banks face 
heightened risk and exposure due to the “toxic” assets on their balance sheets, 
regulators should view prophylactic measures with respect to investments by 
regulated market participants in any type of speculative derivatives.  The causal 
connection between these risks and bank reputation effects alone should give pause 
to those concerned with bank safety and soundness. 
Even if followed, securities regime rules on disclosure cannot keep pace 
when rapid declines in values of derivatives or naked positions need to be covered 
immediately because illiquidity is self reinforcing.  In this respect at least, the use of a 
heuristic tool, such as a prophylactic measure, may be the optimal regulatory 
approach until a more long-term, structural solution is found.128  Banks and hedge 
funds that hold naked derivative default swaps are creating externalities and risking 
contamination of the financial system for the rest of us.  Our government, of the 
people, by the people, and for the people, needs to step up and protect the people—
not the banks and market participants whose self-interested behavior has 
contaminated our common source of livelihood. 
 
                                                 
128 The use of prophylactic measures in law is not uncommon.  A famous instance is law enforcement 
agencies use of the Miranda warning, which is a prophylactic that ensures that suspects are not 
compelled to self-incrimination in violation of the Fifth Amendment.  See generally Miranda v. Arizona, 
384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
